时间：3月21日中午11:30-13:00

地点：明德主楼734

报告人：吴凡

研讨会摘要：

In markets, sellers tend to exaggerate (oversell) the quality of their goods. We study an information design problem between a seller and a buyer in a setting with two-sided asymmetric information. The buyer knows her valuation for the good and the seller can assess its quality. We show that the model rationalizes overselling, even when the buyer is a rational Bayesian. Moreover, overselling is robust to whether the buyer can haggle. Compared to full disclosure, overselling makes both the seller and the buyer strictly better off (Pareto improving). The policy implication is that a benevolent central planner should not enforce full disclosure.

主讲人简介：

吴凡本科毕业于北京大学物理学院，硕士毕业于清华大学五道口金融学院，目前于加州理工学院攻读经济学博士。研究方向：微观理论，信息经济学，博弈论。