时间：2024年3月4日（周一）14:00-16:00

主题：Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design

地点：明德主楼729会议室

主讲人：宋阳波

摘要：

We study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full efforts, by choosing the work assignment sequence and the rewards to the agents upon success. Whereas the agents’ actions are hidden to the principal, they may be observed among the agents given the internal information that is determined by the network and the sequence. Under effort complementarity, the transparency of the agents’ actions can reduce their incentive costs but with decreasing marginal effectiveness. For several typical network topologies, we derive explicit properties of an optimal assignment sequence, and propose a number of measures to rank networks in terms of total cost and stability.

个人简介：

Yangbo Song got his Ph.D. in economics from UCLA and joined the School of Management and Economics of CUHK (Shenzhen) in 2016. His research interests include game theory and information economics, with a recent focus on misinformation and contracting on networks. He has published articles on a number of academic journals in economics, such as Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and Economic Theory.