数量经济学研讨会  
题目：A Fundamental Error or Logical Flaw in Existing Noncooperative Game Theory 报告人：赵进钢 教授  时间： 2016年6月21日（周二） 10:00-12:00 地点：明德楼主楼623会议室 Abstract：Dr. Lloyd Shapley passed away on March 12, 2016. He was called Mr. Game Theory, and won the 2012 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Alvin Roth "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design." He received the Bronze Star decoration, for breaking the Soviet weather code in Chengdu during the Chinese Resistance War against Japanese Invasion.     This study uses three little-known and yet still significant contributions of Lloyd Shapley to make three corrections in the literature. This presentation focuses on one of such corrections, which formalizes Shapley’s argument (1987) as a fundamental error or logical flaw in several areas of existing noncooperative game theory. The error centers on two assumptions:     A1: Players are able to take collective actions in choosing their choices; and     A2: Players are unable to take any coordinated or collective action in choosing their choices. A2 characterizes the nature of Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which the two players have no access to any communication or coordination. If they could coordinate their choices by communicating with each other or make deals by using a joint counsel, the nature of the game will become that characterized by A1 and thus invalidate the Nash equilibrium predicted by A2. Although A1 and A2 determine a player’s rationality and are the foundations upon which game solutions are built, they have often been ignored or misunderstood in a large number of previous studies。 报告人简介：赵进钢教授本科毕业于北京航天航空大学数学系(77级)、硕士毕业于中国人民大学数量经济学专业(81级)，是第一位在耶鲁大学获得经济博士(92年)的大陆学者，现任加拿大萨省大学经济学终身教授。主讲微观经济，博弈论，一般均衡等课程。在博弈论、产业组织等领域取得多项创建性成果。他创建的分合解 (hybrid solution)包含纳什均衡和合作解两个特例(Games and Economic Behavior，1992)，是分析联盟关系、“分久必合，合久必分”规律等最深刻博弈问题的基本工具。分合博弈、网络博弈和信息经济学(hybrid game，network game and information economics)曾被美国经济协会的期刊(Journal of Economic Perspective)在2000年预测为21世纪微观经济理论的重要前沿课题。他最先用合作博弈分析兼并行为，使得非空核(nonempty core)和盈利能力(profitability)并列成为研究企业兼并等企业合作行为的两大基石(Theory and Decision，2009)。