[组织经济学Seminar]土地供给政策对工业聚集的影响
发文时间:2013-10-10

中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心

组织经济学Seminar

【OE201312】

组织经济学(Organizational Economics)Seminar由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心(CFOS)主办。CFOS的宗旨是,利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题,推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS,请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn

时间:2013年10月12日(周六)12:00-13:30

地点:明德主楼734会议室

主讲徐瑛

主题:土地供给政策对工业聚集的影响/A Theory about Land Competition of New Economic Geography

摘要:This paper developed a novel model focused on the impact that the land competition, caused by factor’s mobility, poses on the land supply of local governments in Nash equilibrium. The author discovered that: (1) core-periphery configuration also exists under the new fixed input setting. (2) More industrial land supply doesn’t always attract more mobile factor. (3) Land competition’s effect on Nash equilibrium differs thoroughly among various exogenous conditions. Finally, the general model is applied to China, and the following conclusion was subsequently drawn: GDP oriented and income oriented governments both bring land waste risks to the economy; and encouraging innovation is a possible way to relieve the resource burden of the land.

演讲者简介徐瑛,经济学博士,365体育官方唯一入口副教授。研究方向为空间经济学、区域经济学、经济地理。曾在《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》等刊物发表论文数篇,并主持国家自然科学基金项目。

项目协调人:聂辉华

365体育官方唯一入口

人大企业与组织研究中心

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