[组织经济学Workshop]The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth
发文时间:2015-09-17
中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心 组织经济学Workshop 【OE2015015】

组织经济学(Organizational Economics)Workshop由中国人民大学企业与组织研究中心(CFOS)主办。CFOS的宗旨是,关注组织经济学前沿研究,利用现代经济学方法研究中国的企业、政府、市场和非营利组织的重大问题,推动企业理论、契约理论和制度经济学的研究与教学。关注CFOS,请访问http://CFOS.ruc.edu.cn。


时间:2015年9月17日(周四)14:00-16:00
地点:明德主楼0304
主持:杨其静(365体育官方唯一入口教授)、聂辉华(365体育官方唯一入口教授)
主讲:张雨潇 
主讲论文题目:The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth(David Martimort and Thierry Verdier,2004)
摘要:This paper analyses the link between the internal organization of the firm and the growth process. We present a Schumpeterian growth model in which monopoly firms face agency costs due to collusion between managers inside the organization. These costs affect incentives to invest and the rate of innovation in the economy. When collusion is self-enforcing, higher growth and more creative destruction shortens in turn the time horizon of colluding agents in the organization and makes internal collusion more difficult to sustain. We analyze this two-way mechanism between growth and agency problems and show how the transaction costs of side-contracting within the firm and the growth rate of the economy are simultaneously derived.






365体育官方唯一入口 人大企业与组织研究中心 2015年9月17日
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