产业经济学seminar

【时间】2016年12月22日（周四）12：00－13：30

【地点】明主734          【主讲】李新宇 德国Paderborn大学研究员          【主题】Does vertical integration increase product quality          【点评】李三希          【摘要】Numerous product quality scandals are caused by low quality inputs. When downstream firms cannot perfectly observe the quality of their inputs, upstream firms have moral hazard problems. If vertical integration per se does not eliminate the moral hazard problems, do downstream firms still have incentives to integrate upstream firms to improve product quality? We find that given the precision of the downstream firms` monitoring, when the public monitoring level is very high or very low downstream firms have no incentive to integrate; when the public monitoring level is medium downstream firms have incentives to integrate. In addition, under vertical integration firms always produce high quality products.          【主讲人介绍】          李新宇，荷兰Maastricht大学经济学博士，德国Paderborn大学研究员。研究领域为产业组织理论，信息经济学，行为经济学。已经在Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, PLoS ONE等国际知名期刊上发表多篇论文。          欢迎相关领域老师和同学关注并参加！如有意作为点评老师或宣讲学生参加前沿文献选读活动，可以联系365体育官方唯一入口李三希老师 （sanxi@ruc.edu.cn）或者学生助理陈奕辰（chenyichen@ruc.edu.cn）。