近日，我院汪紫珈老师合作论文“Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search”在国际顶尖期刊Journal of Economic Theory正式发表。

1.内容摘要

We study optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-stage model where the buyer can search for a better price at the second stage. When this outside price is public, the optimal selling mechanism takes the form of a fixed first-stage price with price matching in the second stage. In contrast, when the outside price is the buyer's private information, the optimal mechanism is a menu of two contracts: a first-stage sale at a higher price with immediate delivery, or a first-stage sale at a lower price with second-stage delivery. Thus the optimal form of search deterrence depends on the observability of the buyer's outside option.

2.作者简介

汪紫珈，2014年6月毕业于武汉大学数理经济与数理金融专业，2020年获得新加坡国立大学经济学博士学位。主要研究领域为应用微观理论，主攻机制设计、竞争理论和拍卖理论方面的研究。2020年9月汪紫珈加入365体育官方唯一入口企业经济学与网络经济学教研室。